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Abstract
In this paper I bring the recent philosophical literature on theoretical equivalence to bear
on dualities in physics. Focusing on electromagnetic duality, which is a simple example
of S-duality in string theory, I will show that the duality fits naturally into at least one
framework for assessing equivalence—that of categorical equivalence—but that it fails to
meet a necessary condition for equivalence on that account. The reason is that the duality
does not preserve “empirical content” in the required sense; instead, it takes models to
models with “dual” empirical content. I conclude by discussing how one might react to this.
1. Introduction
The past decade has seen a surge of interest in the (in)equivalence of theories among philoso-
phers of science.1 During the same period, philosophers of physics have begun to study a
theoretical relationship, widely discussed by physicists, known as “duality”.2 Physicists
working in this subject often characterize duality as a kind of equivalence between distinct
descriptions of the world—a characterization that philosophers of physics have tended to
endorse as well. And yet, the (philosophical) literature on duality and the (philosophical)
literature on equivalence have proceeded largely in parallel, with very little contact.
My goal here is to bring these two literatures together, and to make a simple (though
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1For a review of this recent literature, see Weatherall (2019a,b).
2For a representative sample of this literature, see Rickles (2011, 2017), Matsubara (2013), Dieks et al.
(2015), Read (2016), Dawid (2017), Huggett (2017), De Haro (2017, 2019), and De Haro and Butterfield
(2017). It is perhaps helpful to remark that de Haro, in various places, uses the expression “theoretical
equivalence”, but his meaning is different from how it is used in the theoretical equivalence literature. (His
expression “physical equivalence” is closer to what others have meant by “theoretical equivalence”.)
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perhaps controversial) claim: Dualities are not (generally) theoretical equivalences.3 The
reason is that dualities do not preserve empirical content—at least, not in the sense that
has usually been required in the theoretical equivalence literature—and philosophers have
generally taken empirical equivalence to be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
theoretical equivalence of any sort.
This claim might seem surprising, at least if one is familiar with the literature in philoso-
phy of physics on dualities, where the claim that dualities do preserve empirical content (and,
often, a whole lot more) is regularly made. For instance, in an early philosophical foray into
string theory, Dean Rickles writes, “Roughly, two theories are dual whenever they determine
the same physics: same correlation functions, same physical spectra, etc. ... [D]ualities map
one theory onto another in a way that preserves all ‘physical’ predictions” (Rickles, 2011, p.
55). Similarly, and more recently, string theorist-turned-philosopher Richard Dawid writes,
“String dualities establish empirical equivalence between theories that often look entirely
different with respect to their basic ontology and physical structure (Dawid, 2017, p. 21).4
And it is not only philosophers who make these claims. For instance, Joe Polchinksi, the
3Butterfield (2019) has also very recently brought these literatures together—and indeed, his position is
very close to mine, insofar as he argues that dualities are not (necessarily) theoretical equivalences because
(for instance) they can make contradictory claims about the same subject matter. (I also note that But-
terfield’s view, here, is closely connected to ideas defended for several years by de Haro and collaborators
(?)—though those authors do not make the connection to the theoretical equivalence literature.) I think
this is entirely correct. Still, I have an important quibble with Butterfield. He takes dualities to be formal
equivalences, and then suggests that philosophers of science working on theoretical equivalence have taken
such formal equivalences to be sufficient for theoretical equivalence. He concludes that dualities would be
equivalences by the lights of the criteria philosophers have discussed. He goes on to argue—along lines
similar to Sklar (1982), Coffey (2014), and Nguyen (2017)—that dualities thus show that formal criteria of
equivalence are unacceptable because they do not capture the role of interpretation in assessing whether
theories may be inequivalent. To the contrary, my position is that criteria such as categorical equivalence,
as proposed for instance by Weatherall (2016) and applied by Rosenstock et al. (2015), explicitly includes a
requirement that the mapping realizing a putative equivalence preserve empirical content in a suitable way,
and that it is because dualities may fail to satisfy this requirement that they are not equivalences. In other
words, insofar Butterfield’s goal was to criticize the theoretical literature, I think he has missed the mark.
On the other hand, I think his substantive remarks on dualities are entirely convincing.
4For one more example, Baptiste Le Bihan and James Read define a “duality” as an empirical equivalence:
“[A] duality is a mapping—that is, a systematic correspondence—between the spaces of solutions of two
theories, such that models related by that map are empirically equivalent (Le Bihan and Read, 2018, p. 2).
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influential string theorist, writes “[I]n simple terms, a pair of (putatively distinct) theories
are said to be dual when they generate the same physics. ... [G]iven this deep notion of
equivalence, it is clear that a very strong kind of observational equivalence follows as a logical
consequence” (Polchinski, 2017, p. 56).
I will argue in what follows that all of these distinguished philosophers and physicists—
among many others—are wrong about whether dualities realize empirical equivalences. But
there is an important proviso: my argument will be that dualities do not preserve empirical
content in a particular sense that has been required in the theoretical equivalence literature.
Hence, my arguments, if sound, can be used to support two different positions: either that
dual theories are not really equivalent; or that philosophers of science working on theoretical
equivalence have gotten empirical equivalence wrong. I will give reasons why I think the
first of these is more attractive, but I take it that both positions would be of interest.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. I will begin by describing
empirical equivalence as it has been understood in the theoretical equivalence literature.
I will then introduce a particular example of a duality—electromagnetic duality, which
is a special case of what is known as S-duality or Montonen-Olive duality—to which a
widely discussed criterion of theoretical equivalence can be readily applied. As I will show,
electromagnetic duality does not preserve empirical content. I will conclude by discussing
what one would need to do to recover empirical equivalence in this case, and explore why
one might not be satisfied by such a move.
2. Theoretical Equivalence
Over the last half decade, philosophers of science have considered several potential criteria
for theoretical equivalence. For instance Glymour (1970, 1980) proposed that definitional
equivalence, a notion of equivalence borrowed from first order logic, provides a natural
criterion of equivalence of theories. Two theories are definitionally equivalent if, roughly
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speaking, the non-logical vocabulary of each theory can be defined using the non-logical
vocabulary of the other, in such a way that any true assertion of one theory can be translated
into a true assertion of the other, and vice versa, in an invertible manner. To avoid certain
technical limitations of definitional equivalence, related to multi-sorted logic, Barrett and
Halvorson (2016) have proposed a generalization of definitional equivalence that they call
Morita equivalence. Halvorson (2012) and Weatherall (2016), meanwhile, have proposed
categorical equivalence (described below), a notion of equivalence borrowed from category
theory, as a more attractive, more “structural” notion of equivalence. And so on.
These criteria are generally named for mathematical relationships between (formal rep-
resentations of) theories. But these mathematical relationships are taken to be necessary,
but not sufficient, conditions for equivalence.5 For two physical theories to be theoretically
equivalent, on any of the proposals just mentioned, one also requires that they be empiri-
cally equivalent, in a way that is compatible with the “formal” equivalence realized by the
mathematical relationships. More precisely, each of the mathematical criteria of equiva-
lence under consideration involves mappings between formal structures that satisfy some
stipulated conditions. We also suppose that given a physical theory that may or may not
be equivalent to another, there is some (fixed, prior) way of associating structures in the
theories with the world.6 Empirical equivalence, in the present context, is the requirement
that these mappings commute.
To illustrate what I mean, consider the case of categorical equivalence.7 To apply that
criterion of equivalence to a pair of theories, we begin by defining categories T1 and T2. The
objects of each of these categories are models of each theory, respectively, and the arrows
5To be fair, Glymour does not discuss this point in the earliest work in the literature; it was Sklar (1982)
who first emphasized it. But in subsequent work, this condition is explicitly included in statements of the
relevant criteria.
6One may think of this “association” as an intensional semantics, akin to what Butterfield (2019, §3.1)
discusses (following Lewis); requiring such an association in advance seems to be what Dieks et al. (2015)
and De Haro (2017) characterize as adopting an “external” perspective.
7For background on category theory, see for instance (Leinster, 2014).
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are appropriate “structure preserving maps”. These categories represent these theories.8 In
addition, one identifies a collection W of “stylized phenomena” or “predictions” that one can
associate with the theory, where each model of the theory will be associated with particular
predictions corresponding to what one might observe (or what the world might be like) if
the world were as represented by that model; we may take W to be a category, trivially, by
endowing each object with an identity arrow.9 Finally, we fix functors E1 : T1 → W and
E2 : T2 → W , relating these models to the “predictions” of the theories. Note that on this
way of setting things up, it is already possible to associate the models of both theories with
predictions in a single category W ; this is not as strong a condition as it appears, insofar as
one could take W to be the union of the “stylized phenomena” associated with each theory
separately, in which case the functors E1 and E2 could still be defined, even though the
theories made incomparable predictions.
To fix these ideas with an example, we might represent (vacuum) electromagnetism in
Minkowski spacetime as follows. We define a category EM:
1. whose objects are Faraday tensors Fab on Minkowski spacetime satisfying the vacuum
Maxwell equations; and
2. whose arrows are isometries χ of Minkowski spacetime that preserve Fab.
We may then take W to consist of a specification of the empirical consequences of a particular
Faraday tensor Fab: its associated energy-momentum tensor, a collection of Lorentz force
curves for test matter of different charge-to-mass ratios, etc. Finally, we may define a
“functor” E : EM → W that takes Faraday tensors to the observable quantities associated
with that tensor.
8How one goes from a “theory in the wild” to a category of models representing that theory is not
always clear or unambiguous (Weatherall, 2019c; Rosenstock, 2019). This is sometimes a virtue, as in,
for instance, (Barrett, 2017), where different categories are used to characterize different interpretations of
classical mechanics; but it can also highlight the fact that some work and prior understanding of the theories
is necessary to even apply categorical equivalence—with the results often depending on what categories one
chooses.
9The details of how one does this are inessential to the point I am making.
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With this machinery in place, we may define categorical equivalence. We will say that
two theories are categorically equivalent if there exist functors F1 : T1 → T2 and F2 : T2 → T1
such that:
1. F1 and F2 are essentially inverses, i.e., they realize an equivalence of categories; and
2. E2 ◦ F1 = E1 and E1 ◦ F2 = E2.
In other words, the categories representing the two theories are equivalent (as categories),
and the functors realizing the equivalence commute with the maps taking models to their
predictions. Thus, if I begin with a model of the first theory and I ask what phenomena are
associated with that model, and then I take the corresponding model of the second theory
under the equivalence, it will be associated with the same predictions as the model with
which I began.
3. Electromagnetic Duality
With this background from the theoretical equivalence literature in place, we now turn to
dualities. In fact, physicists discuss many different examples of dualities. For instance, one
widely discussed example that has played an important role in string theory since it was
introduced more than two decades ago by Maldacena (1999) is the AdS/CFT correspon-
dence, also known as the gauge-gravity duality. This duality relates a theory of gravity in
an (asymptotically) anti-de Sitter space to a conformal field theory on the boundary of that
space. Another, even older, example is T-duality, which relates string theories defined on
a manifold with radius R to string theories defined on a manifold with radius 1/R (Giveon
et al., 1994; Alvarez et al., 1995). Another, recently introduced, (family) of dualities are
the particle-vortex dualities discovered by Karch and Tong (2016) and Seiberg et al. (2016).
And so on.
My focus here is on yet another “classic” string duality, known as S-duality or Montonen-
Olive duality (Montonen and Olive, 1977; Seiberg and Witten, 1994; Alvarez-Gaume´ and
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Hassan, 1997; Figueroa-O’Farrill, 1998). S-duality relates certain (supersymmetric) Yang-
Mills theories whose coupling constants are large to other ones whose coupling constants are
small. This features makes the duality extremely useful, as strongly coupled theories are
generally more difficult to work with than weakly coupled ones. But it is also of interest for
other, more foundational reasons. For instance, it relates theories with gauge group G to
theories whose gauge group is the Langlands dual to G, which suggests a physical connection
to the geometric Langlands program (Frenkel, 2007).
I will not consider S-duality in full generality. Instead, I will focus on the simplest
case of S-duality, known as electromagnetic duality. The rest of what I say will apply to
electromagnetic duality.10
At this point two concerns might arise. First, one might worry that by focusing on just
one example of a duality what I say will lack generality. In fact, I am sympathetic to this
worry, but I would go further: the word “duality” is used in many different ways in physics,
and it is not at all clear that all “dualities” one encounters in the physics literature should
(or can) be seen as instances of a single species. Certainly one does not find a clear or
precise definition of “duality” in the literature, or attempts to argue that such and such
example satisfies such a definition.11 Still, I think the classic string dualities mentioned
above—S-duality, T-duality, gauge-gravity duality, etc.—are meant to refer to importantly
similar relationships, and I think, though I will not argue for this, that what I say about
S-duality applies to these, at least, as well.12 But strictly speaking, whether this is true
does not affect my argument, as my goal is to establish an existence claim: that is, there
10Dieks et al. (2015, p. 209) also briefly discuss electromagnetic duality, and adopt a perspective similar
to the one defended here.
11Of course, philosophers of physics have attempted in recent years to fill this gap—see, especially, De Haro
(2019) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017).
12In (Giveon et al., 1994), for instance, the authors characterize the duality as relating each observable
quantity in one theory to an observable quantity in the other—without, it seems, requiring that the corre-
spondence preserve interpretation in any meaningful sense. Butterfield (2019), likewise, takes this moral to
apply to many dualities.
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exist dualities that are not theoretical equivalences in the sense philosophers of science have
considered.
The second concern is similar, but stronger: one might think that, by focusing just on
electromagnetic duality, I have moved away from the characteristic features of dualities. I am
not considering quantum field theories, much less string theory; I am not making use of any of
the machinery usually used to show that a duality exists; etc. To this I respond: true, but in
these regards electromagnetic duality offers many advantages, especially regarding questions
about empirical significance, because it is much clearer how one should understand classical
electromagnetism to represent the world than string theory. More, electromagnetic duality
is widely cited as a (motivating) instance of S-duality (cf. Alvarez-Gaume´ and Hassan,
1997; Figueroa-O’Farrill, 1998), and so one should expect the relevant features to be similar.
And, once again, even if this turns out to be false, my point is to make an existence claim.
To rebut it, one needs to either refute my argument concerning electromagnetic duality or
else deny that electromagnetic duality is, indeed, a duality. And this latter move, I suspect,
would be difficult to make without also denying that electromagnetic duality is an instance
of S-duality.
We now move on to define electromagnetic duality. For simplicity, we work on Minkowski
spacetime, (M, ηab). Mathematically, electromagnetic duality is a mapping from 2-forms to
2-forms given by:
Fab 7→ ?Fab
where ? is the Hodge star operation. Now observe that this mapping preserves Maxwell’s
equations, in the sense that if∇aF ab = 0 and∇[aFbc] = 0, then∇a(?F ab) = 0 and∇[a?Fbc] =
0.13 It follows that if Fab is a source-free solution to Maxwell’s equations, then so is ?Fab.
13Something similar holds when one permits sources, as long as one allows both electric and magnetic
sources; in that case, the duality also involves a transformation taking electric sources to magnetic sources,
and vice versa.
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One way to see how this duality acts is to fix an observer and decompose Fab at a point,
relative to that observer’s state of motion, into electric and magnetic fields Ea and Ba. In
that case, the duality acts as (Ea, Ba) 7→ (Ba,−Ea).
We can express this relationship in the framework of categorical equivalence. Consider
again the category EM described above. Then electromagnetic duality defines a functor
D : EM → EM, as follows: D acts on objects as Fab 7→ ?Fab; and on arrows as χ 7→ χ.14
Defined thus, it follows immediately that D is an autoequivalence of EM.15
I can now state my central claim more precisely. The functor D does not preserve
empirical content, in the follow sense. Recall that in the previous section, I defined an
“empirical significance” functor, E : EM → W , that takes Faraday tensors to stylized
phenomena. The claim is that D does not commute with E: E ◦D 6= E. In other words, the
electromagnetic duality maps Faraday tensors to Faraday tensors that give rise to different
predictions. The theories are, in this sense, empirically distinguishable, and thus cannot be
theoretically equivalent.
4. Manna lelyalde duality?
Thus far we have argued that dualities do not (necessarily) preserve empirical content, in
the following sense: fix, in advance, how one’s mathematical formalism(s) will correspond to
observable phenomena; then the duality transformation will not necessarily preserve those
phenomena. We will now consider some reactions one might have to this argument.
One reaction is to say that we should not apply the same “empirical significance” functor
both before and after applying the duality. Instead, to capture the sense in which the
14That D is a functor follows from the fact that each map χ is an isometry, and the action of isometries
commutes with the Hodge star operation. We stress that D is a covariant functor, and thus cannot realize
a duality in the category theoretic sense.
15In fact, it is an automorphism—i.e., a categorical isomorphism from EM to itself. To see this, just note
that every Fab arises as the Hodge dual of some Fab—namely, ?Fab—and that D is clearly full and faithful
because of its trivial action on arrows.
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duality realizes an empirical equivalence, one needs to consider both our original empirical
significance functor, and another, “dual” empirical equivalence functor that properly assigns
predictions to Faraday tensors under the duality.
One consideration strongly favoring this perspective is that the stylized predications of
electromagnetism, as described above, involve theoretical concepts that should be trans-
formed under the duality. In particular, the predictions concern the trajectories of (electri-
cally) charged “test particles”. And charge-current density should not be invariant under
the duality: though we have been considering the vacuum case so far, were we to include
sources, one would expect the duality to act by taking electric charge-current density to mag-
netic charge-current density, and vice verse. Though test matter is not, by definition, source
matter, one might nonetheless insist that it is an inconsistent application of the duality
transformation to keep our test matter fixed while transforming fields (and, if appropriate,
sources). Thus, the argument goes, what we really need is an empirical significance functor
E˜ that associates each Faraday tensor with the trajectories of accelerated test (magnetic)
monopoles instead of test charges.
This response has merit, but I see at least two counterarguments. The first is that
employing this dual empirical significance functor seems in tension with a natural rough-and-
ready criterion of empirical inequivalence, where two theories are empirically inequivalent if
I can build a device that would permit me to empirically distinguish them. In the present
case, one could build such a device: in effect, one could build a box that, on its outside,
had a digital display giving us a value of the electric and magnetic fields inside the box.16
And any such device, if used to measure the electric and magnetic fields associated with a
Faraday tensor Fab and its dual ?Fab would, in general, yield different results. In this sense
the theory and its dual are empirically distinguishable by direct experimental test.
16The box might work by, for instance, measuring the force acting on bodies with known charge-to-mass
ratio. But the details of its operation are irrelevant to the point, which is that actual measuring instruments
may realize E or E˜, but not both.
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Second, while it is true that one can always find a different “empirical significance”
functor, E˜, with the property that E = E˜ ◦D. In fact, that D is an automorphism of the
category EM ensures that this functor E˜ is uniquely given by E˜ = E ◦ D−1. If we use
this “dual” empirical significance functor, we regain a sense in which the duality preserves
empirical significance. But we should be cautious about this conclusion, because, as is
evident from the definition of E˜, we get to claim equivalence only by inverting the duality and
then applying our old empirical equivalence functor, E. In other words, we get equivalence
only by systematically re-defining all of the terms so as to effectively “undo” the duality. We
can indiscriminately swap electric and magnetic fields as long as we simultaneously redefine
“electric field” to refer to what we used to mean by “magnetic field”; redefine “magnetic
field” to mean what we used to mean by (negative) “electric field”; “magnetic monopole”
to what we used to mean by “point charge”; and so on.17
Given these objections, the sense of empirical equivalence given by appealing to E˜ might
seem trivial. And in a sense it is: if we permit arbitrary re-interpretations of our theories to
force empirical equivalence whenever we have some mathematical equivalence, then empir-
ical equivalence adds nothing to a (sufficiently strong) notion of mathematical equivalence.
But this is not to say that the duality is trivial. In fact, that the duality map exists re-
flects a highly non-trivial mathematical fact about the formalism of electromagnetism—and,
likewise, for the more sophisticated dualities described above. Even the existence of E˜ is
non-trivial, insofar as it captures the sense in which, given the duality D, it is possible to
systematically and completely perform the re-interpretation necessary to give a different,
17Huggett (2017), too, considers the possibility that dual theories are (empirically) equivalent only insofar
as we take the duality mapping to be a “reinterpretation” or “translation manual” generating a new, dual
semantics. But he ultimately rejects this view, arguing (after Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) and Matsubara
(2013); see also Le Bihan and Read (2018)) that there is another way of seeing dual theories as equivalent,
namely, by taking only those claims on which dual theories agree (on the original semantics) to be physically
significant. On this view, one should think of a duality as a “symmetry” and then “quotient” out by the
duality map. It is hard to see any claims that are preserved by the electromagnetic duality functor, but
pursuing this further will take us beyond the scope of this paper.
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but, in a sense, equally good, recipe for extracting empirical significance from the formalism
of electromagnetism.
There is another line of objection that is related to the foregoing, but which I think is
stronger.18 One might think that there is a basic problem with the starting point for the
analysis given here. Following the empirical equivalence literature, I have assumed that it is
possible, given a theory, to fix, once and for all, how that theory makes predictions. In fact,
how we interpret the mathematics we use in physics itself depends on contingent facts about
physical systems, relationships between different sets of laws, and in many cases, the history
of how we developed the mathematics for particular applications. It is not something we
“fix”, by fiat, given some collection of mathematical structure; nor is it something we can
arbitrarily revise. Now, after the long and messy work of building theories, applying them,
and gradually learning how to interpret them is done, one might be able to summarize
the results using something like the functor E. But E is not given to us, prior to and
independent of that work. From this perspective, then, it is wrong-headed to try to use
E to extract empirical information from the dual theory, D(EM), because to do so is to
stipulate meanings for a putatively “new theory”; really, one would need to imagine trying to
apply the dual theory to real world phenomena, and ask how we would come to understand
how to interpret the formalism from that starting point. Doing this would very likely lead
one to E˜ as a natural way of association the formalism with physical situations.19 So taking
E to reflect the “default” interpretation of the formalism is misguided.
This response further supports the suggestion above, that moving to a different inter-
pretation may be well-motivated in some cases. But it does not undermine the claim that
E and E˜ are different—or that we could not empirically distinguish electromagnetism from
its dual.
18I am grateful to Ben Feintzeig for pressing me on this point (over and over again).
19Why? At least in our own world E˜ is strongly preferred on the grounds of the non-existence of magnetic
monopoles.
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Where does this leave us? The upshot is that there is a sense in which dual theories
are empirically equivalent, and a (stronger) sense in which they are not, at least in general.
They are not (in general) empirically equivalent in the sense usually required for theoretical
equivalence: they do not necessarily preserve “prior” empirical content. They are empirically
equivalent in a weaker sense, where we permit re-interpretations that force the equivalence.
In other words, a theory is, in general, equivalent to its dual theory only with a compensat-
ing “anti-dual” empirical interpretation. How well-motivated this re-interpretation is will
depend on context.
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